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PARTIES
Appellants are Mahlon Peck & Family, Inc. ("Peck") and appellees are Lloyd R,
Brooks, et al. ("Brooks").
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Brooks does not contest the Statement of Jurisdiction contained in the Brief of
Appellants.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1)

If this Court undertakes judicial review of the arbitration award at all, should

it reverse the district court's order confirming the award and dismissing Peck's complaint
when Peck fails to acknowledge or marshal the evidence supporting the award, when
substantial, competent evidence supports the arbitrator's factual findings, and when given
those findings, there is no showing whatsoever the arbitrator did not correctly apply
appropriate legal standards?
2)

When Peck failed to challenge the arbitration award in the district court

before or after Brooks moved to confirm the award, can or should this Court reverse the
district court's confirmation order?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential to the
arbitrator." Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah
1996). A reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for the arbitrator's, and an
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award is disturbed only if the proceeding was not "fair and honest" and did not respect the
"substantial rights of the parties." Buzas Baseball, Inc., 925 P.2d at 947.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL
The following statutes are determinative:
1)

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-12
Confirmation of award.
Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding
for the confirmation of the award, and 20 days notice to all parties,
the court shall confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to
vacate or modify the award.

2)

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14
Vacation of the award by the court.
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration
proceeding for vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award
if it appears:
(a)
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other
undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality,
or an arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the
rights of any party;
(c)

the arbitrators exceeded their powers;

(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, refused to hear evidence material to
the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to the
substantial prejudice of the rights of party; or
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(e)
there was no arbitration agreement between the parties
to the arbitration proceeding.
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within
20 days after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party,
or if predicated upon corruption, fraud, or other undue means, within
20 days after the grounds are known or should have been known.
3)

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-16
Award as judgment.
An award which is confirmed, modified or corrected by the court
shall be treated and enforced in all respects as a judgment. Costs
incurred incident to any motion authorized by this chapter, including
a reasonable attorney's fee, unless precluded by the arbitration
agreement, may be awarded by the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case. Proceedings and Disposition Below.

After the sale in the early 1990s of an undeveloped parcel of real property situated
in Utah County, Peck filed a Complaint in the district court against his real estate agent,
Brooks. In a volatile market, Peck became unhappy with the price received for the parcel,
and in ten causes of action complained of breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation and other alleged errors or omissions. (R. 35).
After formal discovery but before trial, the parties agreed to submit Peck's claims
to arbitration before Mr. Stephen B. Nebeker of the Intermountain ADR Group.
Mr. Nebeker received pre-hearing submissions of argument and documentary evidence,
then presided over two different hearings where the participants presented live and
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deposition testimony of parties, lay and expert witnesses, and oral and written argument.
Mr. Nebeker then found in Brooks' favor and against Peck on all Peck's claims. (Exhibit
A to R. 140, Opinion dated April 7, 1997; copy of Opinion attached hereto as "Addendum
A").
Brooks moved the district court to confirm Mr. Nebeker's award on May 14, 1997.
(R. 140). Peck did not oppose the motion, nor did Peck ever request the district court to
modify or vacate the award. The district court confirmed the award by order dated
July 22, 1997. (R. 146).
B.

Statement of Facts.

Peck wholly fails to marshal or even mention the evidence supporting the
arbitrator's factual findings. Without fully describing all facts supporting the decision, the
following are additional facts of record material to this Court's review:
1.

Lloyd Brooks is a real estate agent associated with Century 21 Robinson &

Wilson Realty who has many years experience working in the American Fork area.
(Brooks Depo., pp. 5-6, §2 of Addendum at Tab 9).1
2.

In October 1990, a Mr. Carl Mellor ("Mellor") planned to move his family

catering business and wanted to acquire commercial property for that purpose. (Brooks
*Peck moved to supplement the record on appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 11(h), and this Court granted the motion pursuant to an Order dated
February 25, 1998. Peck submitted two "volumes" of addenda (labeled sections one and
two) with his principal brief consisting of the materials he wished to be added to the
record. When Brooks cites to portions of the supplemented record in this brief, he refers
to the section of Peck's addenda as identification.
4

Depo., pp. 16-17). Mellor approached Brooks to inquire whether Brooks knew of any
available commercial properties in the area. (Brooks Depo., p. 16).
3,

Contrary to Peck's bald assertions on appeal, Mellor and Brooks were not

close friends with a decades-long "ongoing relationship." (Brooks Depo., p. 14). Brooks
testified:
Q:

How long have you known Carl Mellor?

A:

Well, I've known of him for probably 25 - 30 years.

Q:

And how long have you done business with Carl Mellor?

A:

Oh, I'd have to guess. I sold him a piece of property probably 10
years ago.

Q:

Do you have any contacts with Mr. Mellor besides business contacts?

A:

Through the church, through the LDS Church.

Q:

Any social contacts with Mr. Mellor?

A:

No.

Q:

Do you consider him a friend?

A:

Well, I don't know how you're going to define a friend. I consider
a lot of people friends; socially, no.

(Brooks Depo., pp. 14, 16) (emphasis added). Mellor confirmed he and Brooks were not
friends:
Q:

Are you social acquaintances [with Brooks] as well?
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A:

Well, I certainly don't ignore him when I see him. We're not, what
you would say, close.

Q:

Has he ever been to your house, for example, for dinner or you at his
house?

A:

No. One of the few that hasn't. In our catering business, we serve
everybody as often as we can. I don't recall him ever accepting the
invitation.

(Depo. of Carl Mellor, pp. 12-13; §2 of Addendum at Tab 10).
4.

Brooks had heard Peck might be interested in selling an 8.5-acre piece of

undeveloped farm land, and Brooks approached Peck to gauge his interest. (Brooks
Depo., p. 17). Peck indicated he did want to sell the land. (Brooks Depo., p. 17; Depo.
of Mahlon Peck, p. 16; §2 of Addenda at Tab 11).
5.

Brooks performed some market research to gauge the value of the parcel, and

then shared the research with Peck. Based in part on that research and Peck's own past
experience, Peck decided to offer the land for sale at the price of $16,000.00 per acre.
(Brooks Depo., pp. 19, 24). Peck was "willing to sell it at that time at that price" so he
could obtain money to pay off debt. (Peck Depo., p. 32).
6.

Although Mellor did not want to pay more than $15,000.00 per acre for the

business property, he accepted Peck's offer of $16,000.00 per acre, and the parties entered
a standard form Earnest Money Sales Agreement on October 25, 1990, for Mellor to
purchase the property for $16,000 an acre and a total of $136,000.00. (Mellor Depo., pp.
17, 20). The Earnest Money Sales Agreement also provided Peck could farm the portion
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of the property Mellor was not using at a yearly rental rate of $50.00 per acre. (Earnest
Money Sales Agreement, pp. 2-3, §1 of Addenda at Tab 4).
7.

Brooks was the seller's agent as contemplated by Paragraph 10 of the Earnest

Money Sales Agreement, and Mellor understood Brooks to be representing Peck during
flie transaction:
Q:

Did you expect him [Brooks] to protect you interests?

A:

Not when he told me he was selling — that he was representing the
seller at the time.

Q:

In this Peck transaction, do you feel like you got any special favors
from Mr. Brooks?

A:

No.

(Mellor Depo., pp. 48, 56).
8.

Mellor paid Peck an earnest money deposit of $500.00,2 and they initially

agreed on a closing date of May 31, 1991. (Earnest Money Sales Agreement, pp. 2-3).
As this date approached, Mellor requested an extension of the closing date to
September 31, 1991. Peck agreed to the proposal and Mellor paid Peck an additional
$2,000.00 as a down payment. (Brooks Depo., pp. 31-33; Addendum to Earnest Money
Sales Agreement, §1 of Addendum at Tab 4).

2

The amount of the earnest money deposit was roughly one percent of the total
purchase price, which is Brooks' "standard recommendation" as a real estate agent for an
earnest money deposit. (Brooks Depo., pp. 19-20).
7

9.

After the extension, Brooks continued to list Peck's property with the

Multiple Listing Service (MLS) in order to field any "backup offer[s] in case for any
reason the first offer falls through." (Brooks Depo., p. 36; MLS §1 of Addendum at Tab
4). Although other parties inquired about Peck's property in response to the MLS, no
offers were made on the property. (Brooks Depo., pp. 37-38).
10.

Some time later, Peck himself requested another six-month extension to

March 31, 1992, to work out tax and title issues. (Brooks Depo., p. 40; Mellor Depo.,
p. 23; Second Addendum to Earnest Money Sales Agreement, §1 of Addendum at Tab 4).
Mellor paid Peck another $500.00 in connection with the second extension as a down
payment, bringing the total amount he paid to Peck before closing to $3,000.00. (Brooks
Depo., p. 40; Second Addendum to Earnest Money Sales Agreement, § 1 of Addendum
at Tab 4). Brooks placed another listing of Peck's property in the MLS for September
1991 through March 30, 1992. (MLS §1 of Addendum at Tab 4).
11.

Peck and Mellor closed at the original purchase price of $136,000.00, or

$16,000.00 per acre, in March 1992. (Escrow Settlement Statement, §1 of Addendum at
Tab 4). Peck later became disenchanted with the sale when his son Wayne discovered
Mellor was listing the parcel (as developed property) for a much higher price, and Wayne
told Peck he could have sold the property for more than $16,000.00 per acre. (Peck
Depo., pp. 16-17).
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12.

Peck filed a Verified Complaint in March 1994. (R. 35). After formal

discovery, the parties arbitrated the matter before Mr. Stephen Nebeker in early 1997.
One of the critical factual issues was the amount the property was actually worth before
and during the time the sale was pending so the arbitrator could determine whether Brooks
breached some duty to assist Peck in correctly valuing the property for the sale.
(Defendants' Objection to Additional Argument or Submissions, and Closing Argument,
§1 of Addendum at Tab 7;).
13.

Each party presented testimony from an expert appraiser as to the fair market

value of the property during the relevant period. Peck's appraiser, Don Gurney, opined
the property was worth $22,000.00 per acre in May 1991 at the time of the first extension,
and $23,000.00 per acre in March 1992 at the time of the closing. (Cover page of
Appraisal Report of Don Gurney, §2 of Addendum at Tab 13).
14.

Gurney based these estimates on selling prices of other, purportedly com-

parable parcels of property in the area, but Gurney's estimates were vulnerable because
he failed to account for the differences between the other parcels and Peck's parcel, and
adjust the market value accordingly. (Defendants' Objection to Additional Argument or
Submissions, and Closing Argument, p. 7, §1 of Addendum at Tab 7).
15.

For example, in reaching his estimate of fair market value, the comparables

Gurney used were for improved parcels with curbs, gutters, utilities etc., installed or
nearly available, Gurney did not account or adjust for the fact that Peck's property was
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unimproved at the time Mellor purchased it. (Appraisal Report of Don Gumey, pp. 18-19,
§ 2 of Addendum at Tab 13).
16.

Gumey simply ignored that a piece of property is worth more to a potential

buyer improved than unimproved; the actual buyer, Mellor, testified as follows:
Q:

[By Mr. Keller] Now, one of the claims that the Pecks are making
in this lawsuit is that [Mr. Brooks] should have got a higher price
than $16,000.00 an acre for that property. In fact, they're saying he
should have got $22,000.00 an acre.

A:

[Mr. Mellor] $22,000.00?

Q:

Would you have paid $22,000.00 an acre?

A:

No, no way.

Q:

Why is that?

A:

Because for business development . . . I think my son, who is an
engineer, figured that it would take, you know, as much as the
property is worth to get the sewer functioning underneath the railroad
tracks on State Street, and the fact that the railroad tracks prevented
the lower part of the property from being highly valuable for commercial development. At that time, the trains were going through
there on a daily basis, and we had no idea it would be different. And
then the drainage problems with the railroad tracks at that point, you
had to take water uphill to get it away from there.

(Mellor Depo., pp. 57-58).
17.

Opposing Gurney's testimony, both Brooks and Kent Carpenter, Brooks'

appraiser, testified that potential buyers would consider the three "comparable" properties
Gumey used in arriving at Gurney's estimate of the fair market value of Peck's property
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to be actually superior to Peck's property. Two of the three parcels were better suited for
high volume retail development, and in each case the sellers of the "comparables" either
provided improvements such as utilities, water and sewer, or the improvements could be
provided inexpensively. (Defendants9 Objection to Additional Argument or Submissions,
and Closing Argument, pp. 8-9, § 1 of Addendum at Tab 7).
18.

Carpenter estimated and testified that the fair market value of the property

in May 1991 was $14,700.00 per acre and $16,000.00 per acre in March 1992. (Appraisal
Report of Kent Carpenter, §2 of Addendum at Tab 12). Carpenter also employed the
"sales comparison approach" in reaching these values, but Carpenter appropriately
adjusted sales prices of the comparable properties to reflect the differences between the
comparables and the subject property:
Two of the comparables (C-l and C-2 at $25,000 and $20,000/acre) were
representative of freeway commercial land prices for parcels with excellent
access and exposure. Additionally, these sites had utility available and an
accessibility that was much superior to the subject property. Commercial
land sale number 3 also reflected a similar price per acre ($25,000) due in
part to its good access/exposure and seller installation of utilities, characteristics which are considered superior to those possessed by the subject
property. The price paid for this [comparable] property in its original
purchase ($8,986/acre) sheds some light on the upside potential for a small
parcel sell off, that has good development potential and utilities installed
[unlike the subject parcel].
(Appraisal Report of Kent Carpenter, p. 73).
18.

After hearing all testimony, the arbitrator found in Brooks' favor and against

Peck on all issues, expressly noting in pertinent part as follows:
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. . . It is my opinion that the appraisal report given by Kent Carpenter
more accurately reflects the fair-market value of the property at the time of
the sale from the Peck Family to Mellors. I find that, based upon the deposition testimony of Mr. Mellor and the testimony of Mr. Brooks, Mr. Brooks
was representing the seller [Peck] and did not violate his fiduciary duty to
the Pecks.
(Exhibit A to R. 140, Addendum A).
19.

This appeal ensued after Brooks moved the district court to confirm the

arbitration award and the district court did so, dismissing Peck's complaint on the merits,
and without Peck petitioning the trial court to modify or vacate the arbitration award.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

Even if this Court determines it may or should review the arbitration award

on the statutory grounds Peck raises, manifest disregard of the law or violation of public
policy, the award cannot be disturbed on either ground. The arbitrator found as a factual
matter Brooks correctly valued the land and breached no fiduciary duty. Peck fails to provide any basis for this Court to disregard the arbitrator's factual findings. Peck's claims
of manifest disregard of the law and violation of public policy are thinly veiled attempts
to question the arbitrator's judgment and unnecessarily increase the length and cost of an
already lengthy, costly and factually unsupported litigation.
POINT II:

Peck's failure to petition the trial court to vacate the arbitration award within

twenty days after Brooks moved for confirmation of the award precludes him from challenging the award on appeal for manifest disregard of the law or violation of public policy.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-14 provides that a party to an arbitration can move the trial
12

court to vacate an award upon several enumerated grounds. Utah courts have held that
parties who do not contest the arbitration award at the trial court level pursuant to § 7831a-14 cannot seek appellate relief to vacate the award on any of the grounds in this
statute.
POINT III: Brooks should be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this
appeal either under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33 governing frivolous appeals or
under the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Buzas Baseball, Inc., supra, regarding Utah
Code Ann. § 78-31a-16.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ARBITRATOR NEITHER MANIFESTLY DISREGARDED THE LAW NOR VIOLATED PUBLIC
POLICY IN FINDING IN BROOKS' FAVOR.
Peck pays lip service to appropriate standards of review and claims he is not
challenging "the factual findings of the arbitrator," but then devotes his brief to doing just
that. Peck's "Statement of the Case" on pages 5-6 of his brief is a recitation of the
evidence he faults the arbitrator for ignoring in ruling in Brooks' favor. Peck attempts to
attack the arbitrator's factual finding that the opinions of Brooks' expert appraiser more
accurately reflected the fair market value of the subject property than the opinions of
Peck's appraiser. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 31-33). Finally, Peck recounts the evidence
presented at the arbitration supporting his position in his "Statement of Facts," often
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without any record citation and often inaccurately, without mentioning any of the abundant
evidence Mr. Nebeker relied upon in reaching his decision of "no cause of action. "3 (Brief
of Appellant, pp. 7-12). Peck's supposed challenges on the grounds of manifest disregard
of the law and violation of public policy amount to an improper attempt to challenge the
factual findings implicit in the arbitrator's decision.
A.

The Arbitrator Did Not Manifestly Disregard the Law.

"Manifest disregard of the law" is not necessarily a ground upon which an arbitration award can be vacated. Buzas Baseball, Inc., 925 P.2d at 951 n.8 ("However, we
reserve the issue of whether this ground is recognized in Utah"). In any event it is
narrowly construed; "'manifest disregard' is much more than mere error in the law." Id.
at 951. The arbitrator must make such a fundamental legal error that it would be obvious
to the average arbitrator. Id. at 951. Moreover, the arbitrator must recognize a "clearly
governing legal principle" but decide to ignore it. Id. at 951.
Under these standards Peck's argument borders on frivolity.

Implicit in

Mr. Nebeker's decision of "no cause of action" is a determination that upon the facts
presented at the arbitration hearing, Brooks did not breach his duties to Peck.
Mr. Nebeker expressly stated in his findings "that the appraisal report given by Kent
Carpenter more accurately reflects the fair-market value of the property at the time of the

3

To present a more accurate picture of the arbitration proceeding, Brooks has
marshaled some of the evidence supporting of the arbitrator's decision in his Statement of
Facts above.
14

sale from the Peck Family to Mellors [and] . . . Mr. Brooks was representing the seller
[Peck] and did not violate his fiduciary duty to the Pecks."
Peck attempts to attack these factual findings by a one-sided recitation of the facts.
He wholly fails to identify or even discuss clearly governing legal principles that would
be applicable to facts taken in a light favorable to Brooks, or show how the arbitrator
ignored such principles. Given the facts found by the arbitrator favorable to Brooks on
valuation of the land and relationship with Mellor, Peck cannot and does not point to a
single legal principle Mr. Nebeker misapplied or ignored.
B,

The Arbitration Award Did Not Violate Public Policy.

An arbitration award may be vacated for violating public policy only when the court
finds "a well-defined and dominant policy against the described conduct after a review of
the relevant laws and legal precedents." Buzas Baseball, Inc., 925 P.2d at 951 (citations
omitted). Peck identifies the "well-defined public policy" purportedly violated as the
policy "that a real estate agent has a fiduciary duty to his principal and that he should
honor that duty . . . " (Brief of Appellant, p. 20).
As with Peck's argument about manifest disregard of some legal principle, Peck's
second point is simply an attack on well-supported factual findings based upon only a
partial description of the facts. Mr. Nebeker found as a factual matter that "that the
appraisal report given by Kent Carpenter more accurately reflects the fair-market value
of the property at the time of the sale from the Peck Family to Mellors [and] . . .
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Mr. Brooks was representing the seller [Peck] and did not violate his fiduciary duty to the
Pecks." No public policy is violated if an agent unfairly accused of breaching his fiduciary
duty is ultimately adjudged by an arbitrator to have complied with this duty.
This Court should affirm the trial court's confirmation of the arbitration award
because Peck is essentially asking for a de novo review of Mr. Nebeker's decision. A
reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. Id. at 949.
POINT II
IN ANY EVENT, PECK HAS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO
CHALLENGE THE ARBITRATION AWARD FOR
MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW OR VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY.
After Mr. Nebeker issued the arbitration award, Brooks moved the trial court for
confirmation of the arbitration award pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-12. Peck had
twenty days thereafter to request that the trial court vacate the award upon any of the five
grounds listed in Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14, including that "the arbitrators exceeded
their powers." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(l)(c).
Peck failed to do so, and his excuse is that "none of the statutory grounds specifically set forth in the Utah Arbitration Act for a trial court to modify or vacate the
arbitration award directly apply in the instant case . . . ." (Brief of Appellant, p. 7).
However, he challenges the award for manifest disregard of the law, which he concedes
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is a "judicially created doctrine stemming from the exceeding authority statutory ground."
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 950-51 (Utah 1996).
The Utah Supreme Court has determined on two separate occasions that failure to
contest an arbitration award at the trial level precludes appellate review of the award. In
Robinson & Wells, P.C. v Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983), the losing party in an
arbitration proceeding requested that the trial court vacate the award but filed its motion
after the time provided under statute.4 The trial court denied the motion. Observing that
an untimely motion to vacate an arbitration award "has been held to constitute a waiver of
the right to challenge the award," the Utah Supreme Court refused to vacate the award and
explained that
[o]rdinarily a court has no authority to review the action of arbitrators to
correct errors or to substitute its conclusion for that of the arbitrators acting
honestly and within the scope of their authority. The statute [Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31-16] has provided a method by which an award thus made may
be given legal sanction and reduced to judgment by summary proceedings in
the nature of a motion filed by the court. The statute has also designated the
grounds by which the award may be vacated or set aside, and it is generally
held that no other grounds than those specified can be taken advantage of in
such proceeding.
Robinson & Wells, P.C., 669 P.2d at 846-48 (emphasis added).

4

This case was decided under the former Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-31-1 to -22. The former Act was the same as the current Act in all respects material
to this appeal, with the exception that a party seeking to vacate an award had three months
after the arbitration award was delivered to the parties under § 78-31-18 to petition to
vacate rather than twenty days after service of the award as currently provided under § 7831a-14.
17

Similarly, mAllred v. Educators Mutual Ins. Assoc, 909 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1996),
the appellant sought review of an arbitration award dismissing his claim for breach of
contract without first having moved the trial court to vacate or modify the award pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-13 or -14. The court described these statutes as "procedural
safeguards" designed to protect against unjust arbitration awards. Allred, 909 P.2d at
1266. It affirmed the trial court's order confirming the award because
failure to timely file a motion to either modify or vacate the award forecloses
a comprehensive review on the merits of the arbitration process . . . .
Having ignored the procedural guidelines established for review of arbitration awards, Allred has also failed to identify any statutorily recognized
grounds for vacating the award.
Id. at 1267.
Just as in other civil proceedings, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal because the district court judge should have an
opportunity to consider and rule on that issue.

See LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel

Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah App. 1991) ("To preserve a substantive issue for
appeal, a party must timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing
the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits."); Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d
83, 85 (Utah 1983) (purpose of rule that party must raise issue before trial court is to allow
trial court to correct any error). To conserve judicial resources, the Utah legislature contemplates in § 78-3 la-14 that the trial court is the first avenue of judicial review of an
arbitration award.
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Peck's attempt to bypass the process should not be entertained by this Court.
Brooks requests that this Court affirm the trial court's confirmation of the arbitration
award because Peck did not seek to modify or vacate the award below.
POINT in
BROOKS SHOULD BE AWARDED THE COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING THIS
APPEAL.
Brooks requests that attorney fees and costs be awarded pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33. Brooks alerted Peck by letter dated August 20, 1997, that he
could not seek to vacate the arbitration award on appeal because he did not move to vacate
the award at the trial court level. (Exhibit C to Brooks' Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Disposition of Costs and Fees Incurred). Despite this warning, Peck
forged ahead with his appeal, at considerable cost to Brooks, and, as set forth above, has
himself "manifestly disregarded" applicable legal standards. Under the rules of appellate
procedure, Brooks should be compensated for defending this appeal.
As an alternative ground for awarding attorney fees and costs, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3la-16 provides that attorney fees and costs incurred "incident to any motion"
authorized by the Utah Arbitration Act may be awarded by the court. In Buzas Baseball,
Inc., the Utah Supreme Court construed the "incident to any motion" phrase in the statute
to apply to an appeal to correct the trial court's error in granting a motion to vacate. Id.
at 954. The court suggested that an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party
in an appeal involving the Utah Arbitration Act is almost always justified:
19

Looking to the actual operation of our statute [§ 78-31a-16], it is difficult to
conceive of an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party which would run
afoul of our policies. The only such situation we can imagine would be one
where a trial court awarded attorney fees to a party who did not prevail in
the litigation or who challenged an award and prevailed only as to some very
minor point but lost as to all minor points. Such an award of attorney fees
would arguably defeat the purposes behind the Utah Arbitration Act because
it would not further the goal of discouraging unnecessary relitigation of
arbitration awards.
Id. at 953.
In this case, Brooks is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3la-16. This appeal is incident to his motion to confirm the arbitration award
(a motion authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-12) because it seeks a reversal of the
trial court's order granting that motion.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
Peck has not presented any reason to disturb the arbitrator's award. Brooks
requests that this Court affirm the district court's confirmation of the arbitration award,
and award him reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this appeal.
DATED this ( ^

day of May, 1998.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rv (7,^7- P.

fi&j.^

U Robert C. Keller
^ Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Appellee Brooks, et al.
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ADDENDUM A:
ARBITRATOR OPINION DATED APRIL 9, 1997
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INTERKOUNTAIN ADR GROUP
MAHLON PECK & FAMILY, INC.
Plaintiff,

OPINIOH

v.

case No, 940400145

LLOYD R. BROOKS, «t al.,
Defendants.

I, Stephen B. Nebeker, arbitrator in the aboveentitled natter, having reviewed the briefs, including closing
arguments submitted by the plaintiffs and the defendants, the
case law, the appraisal reports submitted by Kent Carpenter and
Don R. Gurney, and the deposition testimony submitted by Mahlon
Feck, Lloyd Brooks and Carl Mellor, make the following
determination;
I find the issues in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs no cause of action and deny plaintiffs'
claims in their entirety.

It is my opinion that the appraisal

report given by Kent Carpenter more accurately reflects the
fair-market value of the property at the time of the sale from
the Peck Family to Mellors.

I find that, based upon the

deposition testimony of Mr, Mellor and the testimony of Mr.
Brooks, Kr. Brooks was representing the seller and did not
violate his fiduciary duty to the Pecks.
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It is further my opinion that aach party should baar
their own costs and attorneys' fmm incurred in this matter.
DATED thia ^ T day of April, 1997.
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